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#16
04-11-2006, 07:57 PM
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04-11-2006, 07:58 PM
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#19
04-12-2006, 09:21 AM
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 I get that US and other companies made lots of money, but W and those companies do not have the rights to any of that oil. If they do, let's see the proof of that.As for the WMD - that is a complicated issue as the world thought SH had them and we bombed the crap out of them and risked all out war during the Clinton Administration in pursuit of them and to punish SH for failing to comply with the numerous UN Resolutions and his 91 agreement to provide full disclosure. So, to say the whole WMD was a ruse W made up is inaccurate and unsupported by history and the facts. Now, did W twist that theory - yes he did. But, after 9/11, I think pursuing the eradication of any possibility that SH had them was a valid exercise and the world via the UN supports me on this. I do not, however, support W's invasion prior to the completion of the last inspection. Personally, I think SH thought he had Russia and France on his side through money deals and those two countries via the Security Council would prevent the US from invading Iraq, and there is lots of evidence to support this. Finally, here is where I get the world's view on the WMD prior to the invasion and the source of the threory behind the invasion (emphasis supplied) - I mean if the UN did not think he had them, why did they unanimously want the inspections? Text of U.N. resolution on Iraq The Security Council, Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions, in particular its resolutions 661 (1990) of 6 August 1990, 678 (1990) of 29 November 1990, 686 (1991) of 2 March 1991, 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991, 688 (1991) of 5 April 1991, 707 (1991) of 15 August 1991, 715 (1991) of 11 October 1991, 986 (1995) of 14 April 1995, and 1284 (1999) of 17 December 1999, and all the relevant statements of its President, Recalling also its resolution 1382 (2001) of 29 November 2001 and its intention to implement it fully, Recognizing the threat Iraq's noncompliance with Council resolutions and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles poses to international peace and security, Recalling that its resolution 678 (1990) authorized Member States to use all necessary means to uphold and implement its resolution 660 (1990) of 2 August 1990 and all relevant resolutions subsequent to Resolution 660 (1990) and to restore international peace and security in the area, Further recalling that its resolution 687 (1991) imposed obligations on Iraq as a necessary step for achievement of its stated objective of restoring international peace and security in the area, Deploring the fact that Iraq has not provided an accurate, full, final, and complete disclosure, as required by resolution 687 (1991), of all aspects of its programmes to develop weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles with a range greater than one hundred and fifty kilometres, and of all holdings of such weapons, their components and production facilities and locations, as well as all other nuclear programmes, including any which it claims are for purposes not related to nuclear-weapons-usable material, Deploring further that Iraq repeatedly obstructed immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access to sites designated by the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), failed to cooperate fully and unconditionally with UNSCOM and IAEA weapons inspectors, as required by resolution 687 (1991), and ultimately ceased all cooperation with UNSCOM and the IAEA in 1998, Deploring the absence, since December 1998, in Iraq of international monitoring, inspection, and verification, as required by relevant resolutions, of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, in spite of the Council's repeated demands that Iraq provide immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access to the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), established in resolution 1284 (1999) as the successor organization to UNSCOM, and the IAEA, and regretting the consequent prolonging of the crisis in the region and the suffering of the Iraqi people, Deploring also that the Government of Iraq has failed to comply with its commitments pursuant to resolution 687 (1991) with regard to terrorism, pursuant to resolution 688 (1991) to end repression of its civilian population and to provide access by international humanitarian organizations to all those in need of assistance in Iraq, and pursuant to resolutions 686 (1991), 687 (1991), and 1284 (1999) to return or cooperate in accounting for Kuwaiti and third country nationals wrongfully detained by Iraq, or to return Kuwaiti property wrongfully seized by Iraq, Recalling that in its resolution 687 (1991) the Council declared that a ceasefire would be based on acceptance by Iraq of the provisions of that resolution, including the obligations on Iraq contained therein, Determined to ensure full and immediate compliance by Iraq without conditions or restrictions with its obligations under resolution 687 (1991) and other relevant resolutions and recalling that the resolutions of the Council constitute the governing standard of Iraqi compliance, Recalling that the effective operation of UNMOVIC, as the successor organization to the Special Commission, and the IAEA is essential for the implementation of resolution 687 (1991) and other relevant resolutions, Noting the letter dated 16 September 2002 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq addressed to the Secretary General is a necessary first step toward rectifying Iraq's continued failure to comply with relevant Council resolutions, Noting further the letter dated 8 October 2002 from the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC and the Director General of the IAEA to General Al-Saadi of the Government of Iraq laying out the practical arrangements, as a follow-up to their meeting in Vienna, that are prerequisites for the resumption of inspections in Iraq by UNMOVIC and the IAEA, and expressing the gravest concern at the continued failure by the Government of Iraq to provide confirmation of the arrangements as laid out in that letter, Reaffirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq, Kuwait, and the neighbouring States, Commending the Secretary General and members of the League of Arab States and its Secretary General for their efforts in this regard, Determined to secure full compliance with its decisions, Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 1. Decides that Iraq has been and remains in material breach of its obligations under relevant resolutions, including resolution 687 (1991), in particular through Iraq's failure to cooperate with United Nations inspectors and the IAEA, and to complete the actions required under paragraphs 8 to 13 of resolution 687 (1991); 2. Decides, while acknowledging paragraph 1 above, to afford Iraq, by this resolution, a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations under relevant resolutions of the Council; and accordingly decides to set up an enhanced inspection regime with the aim of bringing to full and verified completion the disarmament process established by resolution 687 (1991) and subsequent resolutions of the Council; 3. Decides that, in order to begin to comply with its disarmament obligations, in addition to submitting the required biannual declarations, the Government of Iraq shall provide to UNMOVIC, the IAEA, and the Council, not later than 30 days from the date of this resolution, a currently accurate, full, and complete declaration of all aspects of its programmes to develop chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and other delivery systems such as unmanned aerial vehicles and dispersal systems designed for use on aircraft, including any holdings and precise locations of such weapons, components, sub-components, stocks of agents, and related material and equipment, the locations and work of its research, development and production facilities, as well as all other chemical, biological, and nuclear programmes, including any which it claims are for purposes not related to weapon production or material; 4. Decides that false statements or omissions in the declarations submitted by Iraq pursuant to this resolution and failure by Iraq at any time to comply with, and cooperate fully in the implementation of, this resolution shall constitute a further material breach of Iraq's obligations and will be reported to the Council for assessment in accordance with paragraphs 11 and or 12 below; 5. Decides that Iraq shall provide UNMOVIC and the IAEA immediate, unimpeded, unconditional, and unrestricted access to any and all, including underground, areas, facilities, buildings, equipment, records, and means of transport which they wish to inspect, as well as immediate, unimpeded, unrestricted, and private access to all officials and other persons whom UNMOVIC or the IAEA wish to interview in the mode or location of UNMOVIC's or the IAEA's choice pursuant to any aspect of their mandates; further decides that UNMOVIC and the IAEA may at their discretion conduct interviews inside or outside of Iraq, may facilitate the travel of those interviewed and family members outside of Iraq, and that, at the sole discretion of UNMOVIC and the IAEA, such interviews may occur without the presence of observers from the Iraqi government; and instructs UNMOVIC and requests the IAEA to resume inspections no later than 45 days following adoption of this resolution and to update the Council 60 days thereafter; 6. Endorses the 8 October 2002 letter from the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC and the Director General of the IAEA to General Al-Saadi of the Government of Iraq, which is annexed hereto, and decides that the contents of the letter shall be binding upon Iraq; 7. Decides further that, in view of the prolonged interruption by Iraq of the presence of UNMOVIC and the IAEA and in order for them to accomplish the tasks set forth in this resolution and all previous relevant resolutions and notwithstanding prior understandings, the Council hereby establishes the following revised or additional authorities, which shall be binding upon Iraq , to facilitate their work in Iraq: -- UNMOVIC and the IAEA shall determine the composition of their inspection teams and ensure that these teams are composed of the most qualified and experienced experts available; -- All UNMOVIC and IAEA personnel shall enjoy the privileges and immunities, corresponding to those of experts on mission, provided in the Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations and the Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the IAEA ; -- UNMOVIC and the IAEA shall have unrestricted rights of entry into and out of Iraq, the right to free, unrestricted, and immediate movement to and from inspection sites, and the right to inspect any sites and buildings, including immediate, unimpeded, unconditional, and unrestricted access to Presidential Sites equal to that at other sites, notwithstanding the provisions of resolution 1154 (1998); -- UNMOVIC and the IAEA shall have the right to be provided by Iraq the names of all personnel currently and formerly associated with Iraq's chemical, biological, nuclear, and ballistic missile programmes and the associated research, development, and production facilities; -- Security of UNMOVIC and IAEA facilities shall be ensured by sufficient UN security guards; -- UNMOVIC and the IAEA shall have the right to declare, for the purposes of freezing a site to be inspected, exclusion zones, including surrounding areas and transit corridors, in which Iraq will suspend ground and aerial movement so that nothing is changed in or taken out of a site being inspected; -- UNMOVIC and the IAEA shall have the free and unrestricted use and landing of fixed- and rotary-winged aircraft, including manned and unmanned reconnaissance vehicles; -- UNMOVIC and the IAEA shall have the right at their sole discretion verifiably to remove, destroy, or render harmless all prohibited weapons, subsystems, components, records, materials, and other related items, and the right to impound or close any facilities or equipment for the production thereof; and -- UNMOVIC and the IAEA shall have the right to free import and use of equipment or materials for inspections and to seize and export any equipment, materials, or documents taken during inspections, without search of UNMOVIC or IAEA personnel or official or personal baggage; 8. Decides further that Iraq shall not take or threaten hostile acts directed against any representative or personnel of the United Nations or the IAEA or of any Member State taking action to uphold any Council resolution; 9. Requests the Secretary General immediately to notify Iraq of this resolution, which is binding on Iraq; demands that Iraq confirm within seven days of that notification its intention to comply fully with this resolution; and demands further that Iraq cooperate immediately, unconditionally, and actively with UNMOVIC and the IAEA; 10. Requests all Member States to give full support to UNMOVIC and the IAEA in the discharge of their mandates, including by providing any information related to prohibited programmes or other aspects of their mandates, including on Iraqi attempts since 1998 to acquire prohibited items, and by recommending sites to be inspected, persons to be interviewed, conditions of such interviews, and data to be collected, the results of which shall be reported to the Council by UNMOVIC and the IAEA; 11. Directs the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC and the Director General of the IAEA to report immediately to the Council any interference by Iraq with inspection activities, as well as any failure by Iraq to comply with its disarmament obligations, including its obligations regarding inspections under this resolution; 12. Decides to convene immediately upon receipt of a report in accordance with paragraphs 4 or 11 above, in order to consider the situation and the need for full compliance with all of the relevant Council resolutions in order to secure international peace and security; 13. Recalls, in that context, that the Council has repeatedly warned Iraq that it will face serious consequences as a result of its continued violations of its obligations; 14. Decides to remain seized of the matter. Find this article at: http://archives.cnn.com/2002/US/11/0...ext/index.html
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#20
04-12-2006, 09:27 AM
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It does, however, make for amusing reading Here is a link to a interesting article by Franken on the Clinton Adminsitration's actions related to the pursuit of WMD http://www.lyingliar.com/lies/wmd.htm On edit -- I am not using Clinton's actions to justify W's premature and ill planned invasion of Iraq. I am just applying an historical context to negate Mary's arguement that W's use of WMD was a completly fabricated ruse to invade Iraq.
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save the cheerleader - save the world Last edited by strandinthewind; 04-12-2006 at 09:33 AM..
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#21
04-12-2006, 09:43 AM
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Mary has her political opinions, which you know well, and she's not going to change them so why tell her what they are? She knows what they are. I don't think she is completely blind to Clinton's follies. Its just that, relative to Bush's they were fairly benign. During the height of the impeachment scandal, during which nobody died, Clinton had about a 70% pproval rating. The president's is now at about 38%. He sucks worse than any other president.
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#22
04-12-2006, 09:52 AM
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^^^^
W used essentially the same intelligence as Clinton used - though there were minor differences. Also, if the D's had a spine, they would have prevented W from halting the inpections and prematurely invading Iraq. But, they did not because it would have been political suicide gien the post 9/11 hatred here. No, that many soldiers did not die under Clinton, but many innocent Iraqi's did and they died in the name of the same WMD. Was their death somehow less significant because Clinton murdered them for phantom WMD? How can you make or at least imply that argument? This does not excuse W's premature and ill planned invasion of Iraq. It just puts in an historical context, which is what I was doing in response to Mary saying W made up the WMD intelligence, which he did not. In the end, I think it is incorrect to say W just made up the whole WMD thing to get at the oil. I think after 9/11, W was correct in his pursuit of the disarming of Iraq and/or forcing SH to prove he had no WMD, which SH did not do, though it could be argued he was making a better effort to comply at the very end when he saw the US forces massing in the Gulf. Again, W lied about invading Iraq. But, he was not the first to kill their based on that lie. So, other than W invaded Iraq (which Clinton supported in theory) and Clinton did not, the actions of the two are the same in my book because innocent people died as a result.
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save the cheerleader - save the world Last edited by strandinthewind; 04-12-2006 at 10:21 AM..
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#23
04-12-2006, 10:14 AM
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On December 16, 1998, Clinton ordered a three-day bombing attack against Iraq for Sadaam Hussein's refusal to allow entry to United Nations weapons inspectors - those inspectors W wanted back in as well mind you. The action delayed the House impeachment vote by one day. Judge for yourself about the timing, but people certainly died
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save the cheerleader - save the world
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#24
04-12-2006, 10:22 AM
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save the cheerleader - save the world
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#25
04-12-2006, 12:45 PM
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On point - and the Wilson fiasco proves they are full of shiitte here:
White House defends Bush's post-invasion WMD claims Group found Iraqi trailers to be non-WMD related, paper says WASHINGTON (AP) -- President George W. Bush's claim three years ago that weapons of mass destruction were found in Iraq was based on U.S. intelligence that was later proved false, the White House acknowledged on Wednesday. But presidential spokesman Scott McClellan vigorously denied suggestions that Bush was making claims that had been debunked when he said two small trailers seized in Iraq were mobile biological laboratories. Bush declared in a May 2003 television interview, "We have found the weapons of mass destruction." The claim, repeated by top administration officials for months afterward, was cited at the time as supporting evidence for the decision to go to war. The Washington Post reported Wednesday that experts on a Pentagon-sponsored mission who examined the trailers concluded that they had nothing to do with biological weapons and sent their findings to Washington in a classified report on May 27, 2003. One day later, the Central Intelligence Agency and Defense Intelligence Agency publicly issued an assessment saying the opposite -- that U.S. officials were confident that the trailers were used to produce biological weapons. The assessment said the mobile facilities represented "the strongest evidence to date that Iraq was hiding a biological warfare program." On May 29, 2003, the president repeated the claims from the public intelligence report. McClellan dismissed the Post article and a report based on it that aired on ABC News Wednesday morning as irresponsible. He said ABC News should apologize and took issue with the way the Post story was written. "The lead suggested that what the president was saying was based on something that had been debunked, and that is not true," McClellan said. "In fact, the president was saying something that was based on what the intelligence community -- through the CIA and DIA -- were saying." McClellan said information for public reports from the CIA comes from many sources and takes time to vet. "It's not something that, they will tell you, turns on a dime," McClellan said. The actions of the special team were described to a Washington Post reporter in interviews with government officials and weapons experts who participated in the mission or had direct knowledge of it. The final report remains classified. The trailers along with aluminum tubes acquired by Iraq for an alleged nuclear weapons program were primary evidence the Bush administration used to support its contention that Iraq was making weapons of mass destruction. Intelligence officials and the White House have repeatedly denied claims that intelligence was exaggerated or manipulated in the months before the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003. The Iraq Survey Group concluded in 2004 that there was no evidence that Iraq produced weapons of mass destruction after 1991. It said Saddam Hussein's ability to develop such weapons had diminished -- not grown -- during a dozen years of sanctions before last year's U.S.-led invasion. Find this article at: http://www.cnn.com/2006/US/04/12/ira....ap/index.html
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save the cheerleader - save the world
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#27
04-12-2006, 05:54 PM
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b) Shortly after W announced his "preemptive strike doctrine" and invaded Iraq, Hans Blix announced Iraq had no WMD c) Bush KNEW his intel was faulty, Clinton did NOT. you keep using that same tired argument and it didnt work then. d) Im not proud of the Dems that caved. But Iwas not one of them. I've said from the beginning, Bushwhacker had an agenda. Time has proven me right. e) Bush may not be plunging his actual hands into an oil well, but I betcha dollars to donuts, somehow his family stands to benefit from being in control of Iraq's oil. We already know Cheney via Halliburton is benefitting....Bush, coming from a Texas Oil family is in there too. As soon as I get proof, you're gonna see it believe me. f) the following is a series of Iraq/WMD timelines from various sources. and here is a complete timeline re: Iraq and WMD. and this graph shows the ACTUAL events, including Saddams cooperation and his statements (and the evidence) that he had NO WMD. 311 POL 12-Sep-01 Iraq misinterprets US reaction to events of 9/11; adopts ill-conceived diplomatic position 312 OTHER/NUC Late 2001 IAEC Modernization Project begins and initiates purchase of CNC machines 313 POL Oct-Nov 2001 Enduring Freedom defeats the Taliban in Afghanistan 314 DS Dec 2001 Iraq begins serial production of the Al Samud II 315 POL Late 2001 Around this time, Iraqi scientists tell Regime leaders they cannot produce WMD 316 OTHER/NUC January 2002 Saddam issues order for IAEC and MIC to implement cooperative projects in physics, machining, electronics 317 PROC January 2002 Saddam directs the MIC to assist the IAEC with foreign procurement 318 PROC 26-28 January 2002 Tariq ‘Aziz visits Moscow and Beijing to bolster international support for lifting UNSC sanctions 319 POL 29-Jan-02 Bush refers to ‘Axis of Evil’ in State of the Union address 320 NUC 12-Feb-02 Saddam declares “We will not return to it” with reference to nuclear weapons 321 POL 13-Feb-02 Iraq says inspectors will not be allowed to return 322 PROC March 2002 MIC front company ARMOS authorized to trade outside of Russia 323 POL 21-Mar-02 Russia blocks UNSC attempt to tighten-up OFF, reduce violations 324 POL March/April 2002 Iraq & UN hold new inspection talks in NY 325 DS 01-Jun-02 Jinin cruise missile project initiated (1000km range; 500kg payload) 326 DS 2002 Ibn Firnas recommends MIC cancel L-29 RPV program 327 POL July 2002 Iraq & UN hold more inspection talks in Vienna 328 OTHER/NUC Mid 2002 MIC Rotating Machinery Department (RMD) formed; machine tools ordered, including a balancing machine 329 OTHER/NUC 05-Jul-02 Copper vapor laser demonstrated to Huwaysh; put into storage 330 PROC 2002 Regime procurement with Belarus, France, FRY, India, Jordan, PRC, Russia, Syria and Ukraine leads to further sanctions erosion 331 POL/PROC 2002 Iraq and Russia negotiate $40B oil development deal to be undertaken once sanctions are lifted 332 OTHER/NUC 2002 MIC sponsors 3200 research projects in Iraqi universities (up from 40 in 1997) 333 OTHER/NUC 2002 MIC builds explosive test facility capable of researching shaped charges 334 POL Mid 2002 Iraq begins production of 81mm aluminum tubes for rockets 335 DS Sept 2002 CAD designs for a launcher accommodating missiles up to 1m in diameter; 9m in length 336 POL Sept 2002 Higher Committee, once controlled by Tariq ‘Aziz, is reconstituted to deal with inspections, headed by Taha Ramadan 337 CW Sep 02 Over 900,000 nerve agent antidote autoinjectors had been purchased 338 POL 12-Sep-02 Bush calls Iraq ‘Grave and gathering danger’ in UN General Assembly (UNGA) speech 339 POL 16-Sep-02 Iraq agrees to readmit inspectors 340 POL 18-Sep-02 Publication of UK Iraq WMD dossier 341 POL Nov 2002 MIC scientists meet and are told that Iraq has no WMD, and they must not hide anything from inspectors 342 DS Nov 2002 Jinin and other covert delivery system programs suspended due to return of inspectors 343 POL 08-Nov-02 UNSCR 1441 finds Iraq in material breach, calls for disarmament and FFCD 344 POL 08-Nov-02 Russia refuses to veto UNSCR 1441 345 POL 27-Nov-02 UNMOVIC inspections begin 346 POL Dec 2002 Saddam tells his Generals he does not have WMD 347 POL Dec 2002 Saddam tells military leaders/senior leaders to “cooperate completely” with inspectors 348 POL/DS Dec 2002 UNMOVIC freezes the Al Samud II and Al Fat’h flight tests upon further analysis of system’s range capbility 349 OTHER/NUC Dec 2002 Details of IAEC dual-use CNC machine purchases provided to UN/IAEA 350 POL End of 2002 Iraq successfully flight tests 81mm rockets with indigenously produced aluminum tubes 351 POL Late 2002 Iraq again attempts foreign purchase of 81mm tubes 352 POL Dec 2002 NMD publishes the Currently Accurate Full, and Complete Declaration 353 CW Jan 2003 Two teams from IAEC and Al Majid Company develop multipurpose controllers for process plant 354 PROC Jan 2003 MIC annual budget at $500M 355 POL Jan-2003 UNMOVIC finds 12 empty 122mm CW rocket warheads 356 POL Jan 2003 Iraqi MoD conference on Iranian WMD 357 POL 20-Jan-03 Husam Amin tells military leaders to cooperate with inspectors, repeating Saddam’s earlier directives 358 POL 20-Jan-03 The MIC directs all Directors General of state companies to relinquish any WMD to the NMD 359 POL 25-Jan-03 The NMD director meets with Republican Guard (RG) leaders and advises they sign documents stating no WMD in RG units 360 CW Feb 2003 Inspection of Al Nu’man factory reveals cluster bomb that management claimed from Al Muthanna 361 POL Feb 2003 According to senior Iraqi Minister of Foreign Affairs, Saddam has decided to use CW against US troops in the event of war 362 CW Feb-2003 Iraq recommends excavating R-400 bomb fragments at Al ‘Aziziyah 363 NUC February 2003 DG of NMD still trying to satisfy IAEA concern over missing explosive lens mold drawings 364 POL 05-Feb-03 US SecState Powell presents evidence of Iraqi WMD programs to UNSC 365 POL 14-Feb-03 Saddam issues directive banning private companies and individuals from importing WMD materials or producing WMD 366 POL 28-Feb-03 Russia threatens veto of UNSCR authorizing war on Iraq 367 CW March 2003 New construction scheduled for MIM plant to provide indigenous multi-purpose production facility, halted due to OIF 368 PROC Mar 2003 MIC has $186M in contracts with Syria (SES Company) 369 DS 1-17 Mar 2003 UNMOVIC bans Samud II and supervises destruction of missiles 370 PROC Early 2003 Regime procurement with Belarus, Bulgaria, France, India, Jordan, PRC, Russia, Syria, and Ukraine leads to further sanctions erosion 371 PROC 01-Mar-03 MIC has accumulated $300M+ in reserves 372 PROC Early March Saddam forms a funds distribution committee consisting of Minister of Finance, President of the Diwan, Presidential Secretary, and Qusay Husayn 373 POL 06-Mar-03 UNMOVIC publishes report - Unresolved Disarmament Issues (Clusters) 374 POL 10-Mar-03 France threatens veto of UN resolution authorizing war; later opposes OIF 375 POL 18-Mar-03 UNMOVIC and IAEA depart Iraq 376 POL 19-Mar-03 Initiation of hostilities and Hans Blix says shortly thereafter: NO WMD says BLIX here is a timeline of the war: http://www.thinkprogress.org/iraq-timeline Thus Jason, there was NO justification as shown by inspector statements, and lack of evidence. btw, the first timeline is from the CIA. Last edited by irishgrl; 04-12-2006 at 07:59 PM..
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#28
04-12-2006, 08:09 PM
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Even MORE Damning evidence Bush LIED.
They knew Iraq posed no nuclear threat
There is no doubt even though there was no proof of Iraq’s complicity, the White House was focused on Iraq within hours of the 9/11 attacks. As CBS News reported, “barely five hours after American Airlines Flight 77 plowed into the Pentagon, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld was telling his aides to come up with plans for striking Iraq.” Former Bush counterterrorism czar Richard Clarke recounted vividly how, just after the attack, President Bush pressured him to find an Iraqi connection. In many ways, this was no surprise—as former Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill and another administration official confirmed, the White House was actually looking for a way to invade Iraq well before the terrorist attacks. But such an unprovoked invasion of a sovereign country required a public rationale. And so the Bush administration struck fear into the hearts of Americans about Saddam Hussein’s supposed WMD, starting with nuclear arms. In his first major address on the “Iraqi threat” in October 2002, President Bush invoked fiery images of mushroom clouds and mayhem, saying, “Iraq is reconstituting its nuclear weapons program.” Yet, before that speech, the White House had intelligence calling this assertion into question. A 1997 report by the U.N.’s International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)—the agency whose purpose is to prevent nuclear proliferation—stated there was no indication Iraq ever achieved nuclear capability or had any physical capacity for producing weapons-grade nuclear material in the near future. In February 2001, the CIA delivered a report to the White House that said: “We do not have any direct evidence that Iraq has used the period since Desert Fox to reconstitute its weapons of mass destruction programs.” The report was so definitive that Secretary of State Colin Powell said in a subsequent press conference, Saddam Hussein “has not developed any significant capability with respect to weapons of mass destruction.” Ten months before the president’s speech, an intelligence review by CIA Director George Tenet contained not a single mention of an imminent nuclear threat—or capability—from Iraq. The CIA was backed up by Bush’s own State Department: Around the time Bush gave his speech, the department’s intelligence bureau said that evidence did not “add up to a compelling case that Iraq is currently pursuing what [we] consider to be an integrated and comprehensive approach to acquiring nuclear weapons.” Nonetheless, the administration continued to push forward. In March 2003, Cheney went on national television days before the war and claimed Iraq “has reconstituted nuclear weapons.” He was echoed by State Department spokesman Richard Boucher, who told reporters of supposedly grave “concerns about Iraq’s potential nuclear programs.” Even after the invasion, when troops failed to uncover any evidence of nuclear weapons, the White House refused to admit the truth. In July 2003, Condoleezza Rice told PBS’s Gwen Ifill that the administration’s nuclear assertions were “absolutely supportable.” That same month, White House spokesman Scott McClellan insisted: “There’s a lot of evidence showing that Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear weapons program.” They knew the aluminum tubes were not for nuclear weapons To back up claims that Iraq was actively trying to build nuclear weapons, the administration referred to Iraq’s importation of aluminum tubes, which Bush officials said were for enriching uranium. In December 2002, Powell said, “Iraq has tried to obtain high-strength aluminum tubes which can be used to enrich uranium in centrifuges for a nuclear weapons program.” Similarly, in his 2003 State of the Union address, Bush said Iraq “has attempted to purchase high-strength aluminum tubes suitable for nuclear weapons production.” But, in October 2002, well before these and other administration officials made this claim, two key agencies told the White House exactly the opposite. The State Department affirmed reports from Energy Department experts who concluded those tubes were ill-suited for any kind of uranium enrichment. And according to memos released by the Senate Intelligence Committee, the State Department also warned Powell not to use the aluminum tubes hypothesis in the days before his February 2003 U.N. speech. He refused and used the aluminum tubes claim anyway. The State Department’s warnings were soon validated by the IAEA. In March 2003, the agency’s director stated, “Iraq’s efforts to import these aluminum tubes were not likely to be related” to nuclear weapons deployment. Yet, this evidence did not stop the White House either. Pretending the administration never received any warnings at all, Rice claimed in July 2003 that “the consensus view” in the intelligence community was that the tubes “were suitable for use in centrifuges to spin material for nuclear weapons.” Today, experts agree the administration’s aluminum tube claims were wholly without merit. They knew the Iraq-uranium claims were not supported In one of the most famous statements about Iraq’s supposed nuclear arsenals, Bush said in his 2003 State of the Union address, “The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa.” The careful phrasing of this statement highlights how dishonest it was. By attributing the claim to an allied government, the White House made a powerful charge yet protected itself against any consequences should it be proved false. In fact, the president invoked the British because his own intelligence experts had earlier warned the White House not to make the claim at all. In the fall of 2002, the CIA told administration officials not to include this uranium assertion in presidential speeches. Specifically, the agency sent two memos to the White House and Tenet personally called top national security officials imploring them not to use the claim. While the warnings forced the White House to remove a uranium reference from an October 2002 presidential address, they did not stop the charge from being included in the 2003 State of the Union. Not surprisingly, evidence soon emerged that forced the White House to admit the deception. In March 2003, IAEA Director Mohammed El Baradei said there was no proof Iraq had nuclear weapons and added “documents which formed the basis for [the White House’s assertion] of recent uranium transactions between Iraq and Niger are in fact not authentic.” But when Cheney was asked about this a week later, he said, “Mr. El Baradei frankly is wrong.” Bush and Rice both tried to blame the CIA for the failure, saying the assertion “was cleared by the intelligence services.” When the intelligence agency produced the memos it had sent to the White House on the subject, Rice didn’t miss a beat, telling Meet The Press “it is quite possible that I didn’t” read the memos at all—as if they were “optional” reading for the nation’s top national security official on the eve of war. At about this time, some high-level administration official or officials leaked to the press that Ambassador Joseph Wilson’s wife was an undercover CIA agent—a move widely seen as an attempt by the administration to punish Wilson for his July 6, 2003 New York Times op-ed that stated he had found no evidence of an Iraqi effort to purchase uranium from Niger. In recent weeks, right-wing pundits have pointed to new evidence showing the Iraq uranium charge may have flirted with the truth at some point in the distant past. These White House hatchet men say the administration did not manipulate or cherry-pick intelligence. They also tout the recent British report (a.k.a. The Butler Report) as defending the president’s uranium claim. Yet, if the White House did not cherry-pick or manipulate intelligence, why did the president trumpet U.S. intelligence from a foreign government while ignoring explicit warnings not to do so from his own? The record shows U.S. intelligence officials explicitly warned the White House that “the Brits have exaggerated this issue.” Yet, the administration refused to listen. Even The Butler Report itself acknowledges the evidence is cloudy. As nonproliferation expert Joseph Cirincione of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace recently pointed out, “The claim appears shaky at best—hardly the stuff that should make up presidential decisions.” But now, instead of contrition, Republicans are insisting the White House’s uranium charge was accurate. Indeed, these apologists have no option but to try to distract public attention from the simple truth that not a shred of solid evidence exists to substantiate this key charge that fueled the push for war. They knew there was no hard evidence of chemical or biological weapons In September 2002, President Bush said Iraq “could launch a biological or chemical attack in as little as 45 minutes after the order is given.” The next month, he delivered a major speech to “outline the Iraqi threat,” just two days before a critical U.N. vote. In his address, he claimed without doubt that Iraq “possesses and produces chemical and biological weapons.” He said that “Iraq has a growing fleet of manned and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) that could be used to disperse chemical or biological weapons” and that the government was “concerned Iraq is exploring ways of using these UAVs for missions targeting the United States.” What he did not say was that the White House had been explicitly warned that these assertions were unproved. As the Washington Post later reported, Bush “ignored the fact that U.S. intelligence mistrusted the source” of the 45-minute claim and, therefore, omitted it from its intelligence estimates. And Bush ignored the fact that the Defense Intelligence Agency previously submitted a report to the administration finding “no reliable information” to prove Iraq was producing or stockpiling chemical weapons. According to Newsweek, the conclusion was similar to the findings of a 1998 government commission on WMD chaired by Rumsfeld. Bush also neglected to point out that in early October 2002, the administration’s top military experts told the White House they “sharply disputed the notion that Iraq’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicles were being designed as attack weapons.” Specifically, the Air Force’s National Air and Space Intelligence Center correctly showed the drones in question were too heavy to be used to deploy chemical/biological-weapons spray devices. Regardless, the chemical/biological weapons claims from the administration continued to escalate. Powell told the United Nations on February 5, 2003, “There can be no doubt that Saddam Hussein has biological weapons and the capability to rapidly produce more, many more.” As proof, he cited aerial images of a supposed decontamination vehicle circling a suspected weapons site. According to newly released documents in the Senate Intelligence Committee report, Powell’s own top intelligence experts told him not to make such claims about the photographs. They said the vehicles were likely water trucks. He ignored their warnings. On March 6, 2003, just weeks before the invasion, the president went further than Powell. He claimed, “Iraqi operatives continue to hide biological and chemical agents.” To date, no chemical or biological weapons have been found in Iraq. They knew Saddam and bin Laden were not collaborating In the summer of 2002, USA Today reported White House lawyers had concluded that establishing an Iraq-al Qaeda link would provide the legal cover at the United Nations for the administration to attack Iraq. Such a connection, no doubt, also would provide political capital at home. And so, by the fall of 2002, the Iraq-al Qaeda drumbeat began. It started on September 25, 2002, when Bush said, “you can’t distinguish between al Qaeda and Saddam.” This was news even to members of Bush’s own political party who had access to classified intelligence. Just a month before, Sen. Chuck Hagel (R-Neb.), who serves on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said, “Saddam is not in league with al Qaeda‚ I have not seen any intelligence that would lead me to connect Saddam Hussein to al Qaeda. To no surprise, the day after Bush’s statement, USA Today reported several intelligence experts “expressed skepticism” about the claim, with a Pentagon official calling the president’s assertion an “exaggeration.” No matter, Bush ignored these concerns and that day described Saddam Hussein as “a man who loves to link up with al Qaeda.” Meanwhile, Rumsfeld held a press conference trumpeting “bulletproof” evidence of a connection—a sentiment echoed by Rice and White House spokesman Ari Fleischer. And while the New York Times noted, “the officials offered no details to back up the assertions,” Rumsfeld nonetheless insisted his claims were “accurate and not debatable.” Within days, the accusations became more than just “debatable”; they were debunked. German Defense Minister Peter Stuck said the day after Rumsfeld’s press conference that his country “was not aware of any connection” between Iraq and al Qaeda’s efforts to acquire chemical weapons. The Orlando Sentinel reported that terrorism expert Peter Bergen—one of the few to actually interview Osama bin Laden—said the connection between Iraq and al Qaeda are minimal. In October 2002, Knight Ridder reported, “a growing number of military officers, intelligence professionals and diplomats in [Bush’s] own government privately have deep misgivings” about the Iraq-al Qaeda claims. The experts charged that administration hawks “exaggerated evidence.” A senior U.S. official told the Philadelphia Inquirer that intelligence analysts “contest the administration’s suggestion of a major link between Iraq and al Qaeda.” While this evidence forced British Prime Minister Tony Blair and other allies to refrain from playing up an Iraq-al Qaeda connection, the Bush administration refused to be deterred by facts. On November 1, 2002, President Bush claimed, “We know [Iraq has] got ties with al Qaeda.” Four days later, Europe’s top terrorism investigator Jean-Louis Bruguiere reported: “We have found no evidence of links between Iraq and al Qaeda. If there were such links, we would have found them. But we have found no serious connections whatsoever.” British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw, whose country was helping build the case for war, admitted, “What I’m asked is if I’ve seen any evidence of [Iraq-al Qaeda connections]. And the answer is: ‘I haven’t.’ “ Soon, an avalanche of evidence appeared indicating the White House was deliberately misleading America. In January 2003, intelligence officials told the Los Angeles Times that they were “puzzled by the administration’s new push” to create the perception of an Iraq-al Qaeda connection and said the intelligence community has “discounted—if not dismissed—information believed to point to possible links between Iraq and al Qaeda.” One intelligence official said, “There isn’t a factual basis” for the administration’s conspiracy theory about the so-called connection. On the morning of February 5, 2003, the same day Powell delivered his U.N. speech, British intelligence leaked a comprehensive report finding no substantial links between Iraq and al Qaeda. The BBC reported that British intelligence officials maintained “any fledgling relationship [between Iraq and al Qaeda] foundered due to mistrust and incompatible ideologies.” Powell, nonetheless, stood before the United Nations and claimed there was a “sinister nexus between Iraq and the al Qaeda.” A month later, Rice backed him up, saying al Qaeda “clearly has had links to the Iraqis.” And in his March 17, 2003, speech on the eve of war, Bush justified the invasion by citing the fully discredited Iraq-al Qaeda link. When the war commenced, the house of cards came down. In June 2003, the chairman of the U.N. group that monitors al Qaeda told reporters his team found no evidence linking the terrorist group to Iraq. In July 2003, the Los Angeles Times reported the bipartisan congressional report analyzing September 11 “undercut Bush administration claims before the war that Hussein had links to al Qaeda.” Meanwhile, the New York Times reported, “Coalition forces have not brought to light any significant evidence demonstrating the bond between Iraq and al Qaeda.” In August 2003, three former Bush administration officials came forward to admit pre-war evidence tying al Qaeda to Iraq “was tenuous, exaggerated, and often at odds with the conclusions of key intelligence agencies.” Yet, the White House insisted on maintaining the deception. In the fall of 2003, President Bush said, “There’s no question that Saddam Hussein had al Qaeda ties.” And Cheney claimed Iraq “had an established relationship to al Qaeda.” When the media finally began demanding proof for all the allegations, Powell offered a glimmer of contrition. In January 2004, he conceded that there was no “smoking gun” to prove the claim. His admission was soon followed by a March 2004 Knight Ridder report that quoted administration officials conceding “there never was any evidence that Hussein’s secular police state and Osama bin Laden’s Islamic terror network were in league.” But Powell’s statement was the exception, not the norm. The White House still refuses to acknowledge wrongdoing, and instead resorts to the classic two-step feint, citing sources but conveniently refusing to acknowledge those sources’ critical faults. For instance, Cheney began pointing reporters to an article in the right-wing Weekly Standard as the “best source” of evidence backing the Saddam-al Qaeda claim, even though the Pentagon had previously discredited the story. Similarly, in June, the Republican’s media spin machine came to the aid of the White House and promoted a New York Times article about a document showing failed efforts by bin Laden to work with Iraq in the mid-’90s against Saudi Arabia. Not surprisingly, the spinners did not mention the article’s key finding—a Pentagon task force found that the document “described no formal alliance being reached between Mr. bin Laden and Iraqi intelligence.” When the 9/11 Commission found “no credible evidence” of a collaborative relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda, the White House denials came as no surprise. Cheney defiantly claimed there was “overwhelming evidence” of a link, provided no evidence, and then berated the media and the commission for having the nerve to report the obvious. Bush did not feel the need to justify his distortions, saying after the report came out, “The reason I keep insisting that there was a relationship between Iraq and Saddam and al Qaeda is because there was a relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda.” That was the perfect answer from an administration that never lets the factual record impinge on what it says to the American public. They knew there was no Prague meeting One of the key pillars of the Iraq-al Qaeda myth was a White House-backed story claiming 9/11 hijacker Mohammed Atta met with an Iraqi spy in April 2001. The tale originally came from a lone Czech informant who said he saw the terrorist in Prague at the time. White House hawks, eager to link al Qaeda with Saddam, did not wait to verify the story, and instead immediately used it to punch up arguments for a preemptive attack on Iraq. On November 14, 2001, Cheney claimed Atta was “in Prague in April of this year, as well as earlier.” On December 9, 2001, he went further, claiming without proof that the Atta meeting was “pretty well confirmed.” Nine days later, the Czech government reported there was no evidence that Atta met with an Iraqi intelligence agent in Prague. Czech Police Chief Jiri Kolar said there were no documents showing Atta had been in Prague that entire year, and Czech officials told Newsweek that the uncorroborated witness who perpetuated the story should have been viewed with more skepticism. By the spring of 2002, major news publications such as the Washington Post, the New York Times, Newsweek and Time were running stories calling the “Prague connection” an “embarrassing” mistake and stating that, according to European officials, the intelligence supporting the claim was “somewhere between ‘slim’ and ‘none’.” The stories also quoted administration officials and CIA and FBI analysts saying that on closer scrutiny, “there was no evidence Atta left or returned to the United State at the time he was supposed to be in Prague.” Even FBI Director Robert S. Mueller III, a Bush political appointee, admitted in April 2002, “We ran down literally hundreds of thousands of leads and checked every record we could get our hands on, from flight reservations to car rentals to bank accounts,” but found nothing. But that was not good enough for the administration, which instead of letting the story go, began trying to manipulate intelligence to turn fantasy into reality. In August 2002, when FBI case officers told Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz that there was no Atta meeting, Newsweek reported Wolfowitz “vigorously challenged them.” Wolfowitz wanted the FBI to endorse claims that Atta and the Iraqi spy had met. FBI counterterrorism chief Pat D’Amuro refused. In September 2002, the CIA handed Cheney a classified intelligence assessment that cast specific, serious doubt on whether the Atta meeting ever occurred. Yet, that same month, Richard Perle, then chairman of the Bush’s Defense Policy Board, said, “Muhammad Atta met [a secret collaborator of Saddam Hussein] prior to September 11. We have proof of that, and we are sure he wasn’t just there for a holiday.” In the same breath, Perle openly admitted, “The meeting is one of the motives for an American attack on Iraq.” By the winter of 2002, even America’s allies were telling the administration to relent: In November, British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw said he had seen no evidence of a meeting in Prague between Atta and an Iraqi intelligence agent. But it did not stop. In September 2003, on “Meet the Press,” Cheney dredged up the story again, saying, “With respect to 9/11, of course, we’ve had the story that’s been public out there. The Czechs alleged that Mohammed Atta, the lead attacker, met in Prague with a senior Iraqi intelligence official five months before the attack.” He provided no new evidence, opted not to mention that the Czechs long ago had withdrawn the allegations, and ignored new evidence that showed the story was likely untrue. Even today, with all of the intelligence firmly against him, Cheney remains unrepentant. Asked in June about whether the meeting had occurred, he admitted, “That’s never been proven.” Then he added, “It’s never been refuted.” When CNBC’s Gloria Borger asked about his initial claim that the meeting was “pretty well confirmed,” Cheney snapped, “No, I never said that. I never said that. Absolutely not.” His actual words in December 2001: “It’s been pretty well confirmed that [Atta] did go to Prague and he did meet with a senior official of the Iraqi intelligence service.” In other words, Cheney hit a new low. He resorted not only to lying about the story, but lying about lying about the story. Conclusion: They knew they were misleading America In his March 17, 2003 address preparing America for the Iraq invasion, President Bush stated unequivocally that there was an Iraq-al Qaeda nexus and that there was “no doubt that the Iraq regime continues to possess and conceal some of the most lethal weapons ever devised.” In the context of what we now know the White House knew at the time, Bush was deliberately dishonest. The intelligence community repeatedly told the White House there were many deep cracks in its case for war. The president’s willingness to ignore such warnings and make these unequivocal statements proves the administration was intentionally painting a black-and-white picture when it knew the facts merited only gray at best. That has meant severe consequences for all Americans. Financially, U.S. taxpayers have shelled out more than $166 billion for the Iraq war, and more will soon be needed. Geopolitically, our country is more isolated from allies than ever, with anti-Americanism on the rise throughout the globe. And we are less secure. A recent U.S. Army War College report says “the invasion of Iraq was a diversion from the more narrow focus on defeating al Qaeda.” U.N. envoy Lakhdar Brahimi put it this way: “The war in Iraq was useless, it caused more problems than it solved, and it brought in terrorism.” These statements are borne out by the facts: The International Institute of Strategic Studies in London reports al Qaeda is now 18,000 strong, with many new recruits joining as a result of the war in Iraq. Not coincidentally, the White House recently said the American homeland faces an imminent threat of a terrorist attack from a still-active al Qaeda operation in Afghanistan. Yet, the administration actually moved special forces out of Afghanistan in 2002 to prepare for an invasion of Iraq. Because of this, we face the absurd situation whereby we have no more than 20,000 troops in Afghanistan hunting down those who directly threaten us, yet have 140,000 troops in Iraq—a country that was not a serious menace before invasion. Of course, it is those troops who have it the worst. Our men and women in uniform are bogged down in a quagmire, forced to lay down life and limb for a lie. To be sure, neoconservative pundits and Bush administration hawks will continue to blame anyone but the White House for these deceptions. They also will say intelligence gave a bit of credence to some of the pre-war claims, and that is certainly true. But nothing can negate the clear proof that President Bush and other administration official officials vastly overstated the intelligence they were given. They engaged in a calculated and well-coordinated effort to turn a war of choice in Iraq into a perceived war of imminent necessity. And we are all left paying the price. http://www.inthesetimes.com/site/main/article/899/
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#29
04-14-2006, 12:47 PM
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Mary - you are GOT to stop with the caffeine
__________________
save the cheerleader - save the world
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#30
04-14-2006, 08:23 PM
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Quote:
 turns out a bunch of ants made a nest inside a call box on the pole, and there were so many of them, when a phone call rang thru, when the phone RANG, it fried all the ants and completely ruined the connection! EWWWWWWWWW! its all fixed NOW, so I can keep up! Ive got plenty more where THAT came from, believe me!
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