isn't it chilling to think if Gore won in 2000

[strandinthewind]

Originally Posted by gldstwmn

And if you read more of that document you will see that it supports regime change from within. Clever editing there.

Bush I supported this policy when he told the people of Iraq to "rise up" after we left them hanging after the Gulf War. Of course, since they had little means of resistance, they were crushed by Saddam's army. Hence the mass graves and ensuing hatred that propelled the terrorist acts agianst the US since.

I am not and I have never said Clinton wanted to go to war with Iraq as a tool to imnplement regime change. If I did, I was wrong. I said he bombed them in an effort to make them comply with the UN Resolutions, which is different. All, I am saying is NOW Clinton says after 9/11 and the potential threat of SH, the internal regime change policy was outdated.

[gldstwmn]

Originally Posted by strandinthewind

. . . an argument I was not making?

You said that Clinton and W's policies were the same. They're not.

[strandinthewind]

Originally Posted by dissention

We were talking about Clinton's policy and how it had been abandoned. I responded after you posted an oversimplified version of his policy.

I know that you thought you did. But, my point was I was not saying that. I clarified by providing the Act creating the policy If you think I was saying Clinton wanted to go to war to promote regime change, I was not - period.

BTW - I am still waiting for you to somment on Clinton's revised Iraqi policy, which as I mentioned many times fully supports W's reasons for going to war (after 9/11 SH must be held accountable for the WMD because the US cannot afford the risk SH represented), just not his rush to it.

[dissention]

Some quotes from the 9/11 commission, Jason. Please read them all because when I originally posted them, you did not have a response.

"In April and May 2001 the drumbeat of reporting increased. Articles presented to top officials contained headlines such as: "bin Laden planning multiple operations." "bin Laden public profile may presage attack." "Bin Laden networks plans advancing." By late May there were reports of a hostage plot against Americans to force the release of prisoners, including Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, the "Blind Sheikh," who was serving a life sentence for his role in the 1993 plot to blow up sites in New York City. The reporting noted that the operatives may opt to hijack an aircraft or storm a U.S. embassy. The reporting also mentioned that Abu Zubaydah was planning an attack and expected to carry out more if things went well."

"Reports similar to these were made available to President Bush in morning meetings with DCI Tenet, usually attended by Vice President (Dick) Cheney and National Security Adviser Rice as well. None of these reports mentioned that the attacks might occur in the United States. At the end of May, Counterterrorist Center (CTC) Chief Cofer Black told Rice that the current threat level was a "7" on a scale of 10, as compared to an "8" during the Millennium."

"The threat reports surged again in June and July, reaching an even higher peak of urgency. A Terrorist Threat Advisory in late June indicated that there was a high probability of near-term "spectacular" terrorist attacks resulting in numerous casualties. Headlines from intelligence reports were stark: "Bin Laden threats are real." "Bin Laden planning high profile attacks." The intelligence reporting consistently described the upcoming attacks as occurring on a catastrophic level, indicating that they would cause the world to be in turmoil, consisting of possible multiple but not necessarily simultaneous attacks. A late June report stated that Bin Laden operatives expect near-term attacks to have dramatic consequences of catastrophic proportion."

"At Rice's request, on July 5 the CIA briefed Attorney General John Ashcroft on the al-Qaeda threat, warning that a significant terrorist attack was imminent, and a strike could occur at any time. That same day, officials from domestic agencies, including the FAA, met with Clarke to discuss the current threat. Rice worked directly with Tenet on security issues for the G-8 summit. In addition to the individual reports, on July 11 top officials received a summary recapitulating the mass of al-Qaeda-related threat reporting on several continents. Tenet told us that in his world "the system was blinking red," and by late July it could not have been any worse. Tenet told us he felt that President Bush and other officials grasped the urgency of what they were being told."

"On July 27 Clarke informed Rice and Hadley that the spike in signals intelligence about a near-term attack had stopped. He urged keeping readiness high during the August vacation period, warning that another report suggested an attack had just been postponed for a few months. On August 3 the Intelligence Community issued a Threat Advisory warning that the threat of impending al-Qaeda attacks would likely continue indefinitely. The advisory cited threats in the Arabian Peninsula, Jordan, Israel, and Europe, and suggested that al-Qaeda was lying in wait and searching for gaps in security before moving forward with the planned attacks."

"Rice and Hadley told us that, before 9/11, they did not feel they had the job of handling domestic security. They felt that Clarke and the CSG were the NSCs bridge between foreign and domestic threats."

"The FBI had tasked its 56 U.S. field offices to increase surveillance of suspected terrorists and to reach out to informants who might have information about terrorist plots. An NSC document at the time describes such a tasking having occurred in late June, although it does not indicate whether the tasking was generated by the NSC or the FBI."

"We found in our field office visits last fall, however, that a number of FBI personnel, with the exception of those in the New York field office, did not recall a heightened sense of threat from al-Qaeda within the United States in summer 2001. For example, an international terrorism squad supervisor in the Washington Field Office told us he was neither aware in summer 2001 of an increased threat, nor did his squad take any special steps or actions. The Special Agent in Charge of the Miami Field Office told us he did not learn of the high level of threat until after September 11."

"Pickard said in late June and through July he met with Attorney General Ashcroft once a week. He told us that although he initially briefed the Attorney General regarding these threats, after two such briefings the Attorney General told him he did not want to hear this information anymore. The Justice Department has informed us that Attorney General Ashcroft, his former deputy, and his chief of staff deny that the Attorney General made any such statement to Pickard."

"Prior to 9/11 neither Ashcroft nor his predecessors received a copy of the Presidents Daily Brief. After 9/11 Ashcroft began to receive portions of the brief that relate to counterterrorism."

[strandinthewind]

Originally Posted by dissention

Yes, you were very unclear about that. I could care less what Clinton says now or what he supports, he's no longer president. The issue we were discussing was his policy when he was president, not when he was ex-president.

That might the issue you want to discuss because it does not lend creedance to W. But, I am saying and the topic of this thread was what would happen after Clinton left office. Thus, Clinton's comments after he left office are relevant and they certainly do not support your argument

[gldstwmn]

Originally Posted by strandinthewind

He did not go after OBL with vigor

That is an untruth.

[strandinthewind]

Originally Posted by dissention

The interim report refutes all of that and then some.

No it does not and you know it - yet you continue to say it as it were true You know that will never work with me

[dissention]

Originally Posted by strandinthewind

BTW - I am still waiting for you to somment on Clinton's revised Iraqi policy, which as I mentioned many times fully supports W's reasons for going to war (after 9/11 SH must be held accountable for the WMD because the US cannot afford the risk SH represented), just not his rush to it.

His revised Iraq policy was to fund Iraqi opposition forces.

[strandinthewind]

Originally Posted by gldstwmn

You said that Clinton and W's policies were the same. They're not.

They are now. I was talikng about NOW. Clinton has repeatedly said he agreed with W's reasons for going to war but objected to the the way in which W did it and the timing, which is a different argument.

[dissention]

Originally Posted by strandinthewind

No it does not and you know it - yet you continue to say it as it were true You know that will never work with me

It does not support her claim that there were 70 field investigations. Their findings refute that.

You're blind, that's all I can say. Oh well, time to move on.

[strandinthewind]

Originally Posted by dissention

Some quotes from the 9/11 commission, Jason. Please read them all because when I originally posted them, you did not have a response.

"In April and May 2001 the drumbeat of reporting increased. Articles presented to top officials contained headlines such as: "bin Laden planning multiple operations." "bin Laden public profile may presage attack." "Bin Laden networks plans advancing." By late May there were reports of a hostage plot against Americans to force the release of prisoners, including Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, the "Blind Sheikh," who was serving a life sentence for his role in the 1993 plot to blow up sites in New York City. The reporting noted that the operatives may opt to hijack an aircraft or storm a U.S. embassy. The reporting also mentioned that Abu Zubaydah was planning an attack and expected to carry out more if things went well."

"Reports similar to these were made available to President Bush in morning meetings with DCI Tenet, usually attended by Vice President (Dick) Cheney and National Security Adviser Rice as well. None of these reports mentioned that the attacks might occur in the United States. At the end of May, Counterterrorist Center (CTC) Chief Cofer Black told Rice that the current threat level was a "7" on a scale of 10, as compared to an "8" during the Millennium."

"The threat reports surged again in June and July, reaching an even higher peak of urgency. A Terrorist Threat Advisory in late June indicated that there was a high probability of near-term "spectacular" terrorist attacks resulting in numerous casualties. Headlines from intelligence reports were stark: "Bin Laden threats are real." "Bin Laden planning high profile attacks." The intelligence reporting consistently described the upcoming attacks as occurring on a catastrophic level, indicating that they would cause the world to be in turmoil, consisting of possible multiple but not necessarily simultaneous attacks. A late June report stated that Bin Laden operatives expect near-term attacks to have dramatic consequences of catastrophic proportion."

"At Rice's request, on July 5 the CIA briefed Attorney General John Ashcroft on the al-Qaeda threat, warning that a significant terrorist attack was imminent, and a strike could occur at any time. That same day, officials from domestic agencies, including the FAA, met with Clarke to discuss the current threat. Rice worked directly with Tenet on security issues for the G-8 summit. In addition to the individual reports, on July 11 top officials received a summary recapitulating the mass of al-Qaeda-related threat reporting on several continents. Tenet told us that in his world "the system was blinking red," and by late July it could not have been any worse. Tenet told us he felt that President Bush and other officials grasped the urgency of what they were being told."

"On July 27 Clarke informed Rice and Hadley that the spike in signals intelligence about a near-term attack had stopped. He urged keeping readiness high during the August vacation period, warning that another report suggested an attack had just been postponed for a few months. On August 3 the Intelligence Community issued a Threat Advisory warning that the threat of impending al-Qaeda attacks would likely continue indefinitely. The advisory cited threats in the Arabian Peninsula, Jordan, Israel, and Europe, and suggested that al-Qaeda was lying in wait and searching for gaps in security before moving forward with the planned attacks."

"Rice and Hadley told us that, before 9/11, they did not feel they had the job of handling domestic security. They felt that Clarke and the CSG were the NSCs bridge between foreign and domestic threats."

"The FBI had tasked its 56 U.S. field offices to increase surveillance of suspected terrorists and to reach out to informants who might have information about terrorist plots. An NSC document at the time describes such a tasking having occurred in late June, although it does not indicate whether the tasking was generated by the NSC or the FBI."

"We found in our field office visits last fall, however, that a number of FBI personnel, with the exception of those in the New York field office, did not recall a heightened sense of threat from al-Qaeda within the United States in summer 2001. For example, an international terrorism squad supervisor in the Washington Field Office told us he was neither aware in summer 2001 of an increased threat, nor did his squad take any special steps or actions. The Special Agent in Charge of the Miami Field Office told us he did not learn of the high level of threat until after September 11."

"Pickard said in late June and through July he met with Attorney General Ashcroft once a week. He told us that although he initially briefed the Attorney General regarding these threats, after two such briefings the Attorney General told him he did not want to hear this information anymore. The Justice Department has informed us that Attorney General Ashcroft, his former deputy, and his chief of staff deny that the Attorney General made any such statement to Pickard."

"Prior to 9/11 neither Ashcroft nor his predecessors received a copy of the Presidents Daily Brief. After 9/11 Ashcroft began to receive portions of the brief that relate to counterterrorism."

Please provide a site for these.

[dissention]

Originally Posted by strandinthewind

They are now. I was talikng about NOW. Clinton has repeatedly said he agreed with W's reasons for going to war but objected to the the way in which W did it and the timing, which is a different argument.

He is not president NOW.

[gldstwmn]

Originally Posted by strandinthewind

They are now. I was talikng about NOW. Clinton has repeatedly said he agreed with W's reasons for going to war but objected to the the way in which W did it and the timing, which is a different argument.

It doesn't matter what Clinton's policy is now. He's no longer president. I will give kudos to him for the disingeuous way he slaps W for the "timing". Still one of the best politicians-ever.

[dissention]

Originally Posted by strandinthewind

Please provide a site for these.

Try the search option on this very board.

[strandinthewind]

Originally Posted by gldstwmn

That is an untruth.

Well, he has said that he had windows of opportunity but essentially chose not to exercise them because of political reasons. That sounds like an non-vigourous approach to catch some one who attacked our contry here and elsewhere fove or so times at the cost of many lives