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#61
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It will never happen IMO because the D's are too much in bed with W on the war in Iraq, which is on what they could possibly impeach him. They cannot impeach him for poor judicial nominees, promotion of Christianity, etc. But, they can impeach him, possibly, on the Iraq scandal. Plus, the Senate will never vote against W unless a smoking gun is found and it would have to be white hot. In the end, I hope they do not because I do not want to see two consecutive Pres. impeached, much less three in three decades is just too much. On edit - the Valarie Plame (sp.?) name leaking could take Bush down as well. But, Novak aint spilling any beans anytime soon nor will they ever prosecute him because he knows too much, namingly who told him. I think it was Rove. If that is true, then W cannot be impeached for Rove's actions if W did not know about it. Proving W knew about it would be next to impossible absent concrete evidence like taped conversations, which I do not think we will ever see. Thus, that woman was wronged and no one will pay for it, not that anyone cared about it in the general public anyway. Last edited by strandinthewind; 05-30-2005 at 12:36 AM.. |
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#62
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If the Dems take back the House in '06 the will most certainly milk this as a set up for the '08 election. |
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#63
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May 01, 2005
The secret Downing Street memo SECRET AND STRICTLY PERSONAL - UK EYES ONLY DAVID MANNING From: Matthew Rycroft Date: 23 July 2002 S 195 /02 cc: Defence Secretary, Foreign Secretary, Attorney-General, Sir Richard Wilson, John Scarlett, Francis Richards, CDS, C, Jonathan Powell, Sally Morgan, Alastair Campbell IRAQ: PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING, 23 JULY Copy addressees and you met the Prime Minister on 23 July to discuss Iraq. This record is extremely sensitive. No further copies should be made. It should be shown only to those with a genuine need to know its contents. John Scarlett summarised the intelligence and latest JIC assessment. Saddam's regime was tough and based on extreme fear. The only way to overthrow it was likely to be by massive military action. Saddam was worried and expected an attack, probably by air and land, but he was not convinced that it would be immediate or overwhelming. His regime expected their neighbours to line up with the US. Saddam knew that regular army morale was poor. Real support for Saddam among the public was probably narrowly based. C reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime's record. There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action. CDS said that military planners would brief CENTCOM on 1-2 August, Rumsfeld on 3 August and Bush on 4 August. The two broad US options were: (a) Generated Start. A slow build-up of 250,000 US troops, a short (72 hour) air campaign, then a move up to Baghdad from the south. Lead time of 90 days (30 days preparation plus 60 days deployment to Kuwait). (b) Running Start. Use forces already in theatre (3 x 6,000), continuous air campaign, initiated by an Iraqi casus belli. Total lead time of 60 days with the air campaign beginning even earlier. A hazardous option. The US saw the UK (and Kuwait) as essential, with basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus critical for either option. Turkey and other Gulf states were also important, but less vital. The three main options for UK involvement were: (i) Basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus, plus three SF squadrons. (ii) As above, with maritime and air assets in addition. (iii) As above, plus a land contribution of up to 40,000, perhaps with a discrete role in Northern Iraq entering from Turkey, tying down two Iraqi divisions. The Defence Secretary said that the US had already begun "spikes of activity" to put pressure on the regime. No decisions had been taken, but he thought the most likely timing in US minds for military action to begin was January, with the timeline beginning 30 days before the US Congressional elections. The Foreign Secretary said he would discuss this with Colin Powell this week. It seemed clear that Bush had made up his mind to take military action, even if the timing was not yet decided. But the case was thin. Saddam was not threatening his neighbours, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran. We should work up a plan for an ultimatum to Saddam to allow back in the UN weapons inspectors. This would also help with the legal justification for the use of force. The Attorney-General said that the desire for regime change was not a legal base for military action. There were three possible legal bases: self-defence, humanitarian intervention, or UNSC authorisation. The first and second could not be the base in this case. Relying on UNSCR 1205 of three years ago would be difficult. The situation might of course change. The Prime Minister said that it would make a big difference politically and legally if Saddam refused to allow in the UN inspectors. Regime change and WMD were linked in the sense that it was the regime that was producing the WMD. There were different strategies for dealing with Libya and Iran. If the political context were right, people would support regime change. The two key issues were whether the military plan worked and whether we had the political strategy to give the military plan the space to work. On the first, CDS said that we did not know yet if the US battleplan was workable. The military were continuing to ask lots of questions. For instance, what were the consequences, if Saddam used WMD on day one, or if Baghdad did not collapse and urban warfighting began? You said that Saddam could also use his WMD on Kuwait. Or on Israel, added the Defence Secretary. The Foreign Secretary thought the US would not go ahead with a military plan unless convinced that it was a winning strategy. On this, US and UK interests converged. But on the political strategy, there could be US/UK differences. Despite US resistance, we should explore discreetly the ultimatum. Saddam would continue to play hard-ball with the UN. John Scarlett assessed that Saddam would allow the inspectors back in only when he thought the threat of military action was real. The Defence Secretary said that if the Prime Minister wanted UK military involvement, he would need to decide this early. He cautioned that many in the US did not think it worth going down the ultimatum route. It would be important for the Prime Minister to set out the political context to Bush. Conclusions: (a) We should work on the assumption that the UK would take part in any military action. But we needed a fuller picture of US planning before we could take any firm decisions. CDS should tell the US military that we were considering a range of options. (b) The Prime Minister would revert on the question of whether funds could be spent in preparation for this operation. (c) CDS would send the Prime Minister full details of the proposed military campaign and possible UK contributions by the end of the week. (d) The Foreign Secretary would send the Prime Minister the background on the UN inspectors, and discreetly work up the ultimatum to Saddam. He would also send the Prime Minister advice on the positions of countries in the region especially Turkey, and of the key EU member states. (e) John Scarlett would send the Prime Minister a full intelligence update. (f) We must not ignore the legal issues: the Attorney-General would consider legal advice with FCO/MOD legal advisers. (I have written separately to commission this follow-up work.) MATTHEW RYCROFT (Rycroft was a Downing Street foreign policy aide) http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article...593607,00.html |
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#64
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Some Senate Republicans think they have the votes to override Bush's threatened Veto of the stem cell bill,although a couple of staunch conservative Senators have quote said "we learned a lot from the Democrats about how to keep this from even reaching the Senate floor" -- so if it reaches the floor, the stem cell thing could very well pass the Senate, and unlike the House it could pass the Senate with enough to override a veto..
I do think it would be kind of hard for the Democrats to try to impeach Bush on Iraq, when most of them voted to give him the authority to use for force..and while we all know that is much diff than what he actually did with that authority, most ppl. seem to think it's the same Chris
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#65
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#66
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The real case here to me is-- Bush did not even do what he told Congress he would do if they voted to give him the authority to use force. Also as John Kerry, tried to explain in the 2004 election,although obviously some ignorant Americans did not get it---that you can vote to give a President the authority to make a best fit military decision, and later not agree with how he uses , OR abuses that authority given to him by the Congress...as many Democrats do Chris
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#67
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He'll never be impeached, especially not over anything that has to do with Iraq. The Democrats are just as culpable as he is in that arena and they won't open that can of worms, ESPECIALLY since they want the White House in '08. They won't risk more embarassment. Quote:
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#68
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Which is why I can't understand everyone saying he will run again in 08, seems to me the same questions of his words will come again and be rehashed again..the swift boat idiots will come out again--seems like he would be a losing uphill battle in 08 Had Kerry never voted to let Bush use force, things wouldve been much easier..but in reality the whole thing was a lose-lose.. Had he not voted YES, he would have been called a wimp, yadayada, and had he not voted to for the funding (the first time) he would have been accused of trying to fail to support the military Chris
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#69
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#70
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![]() Their main source was Curveball.
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#71
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Well, not really. Essentially that same info was used by Clinton to send ,missles over to Iraq. That same info was used by Clinton to perpetuate the Oil for Food Program, which was as we now know a sham and illegal money making device that cost thousands of lives. So, to say that the D's were innocent of knowing of this false information is factually innacurate. They had been relying on it for years to do essentially the same thing and also to try and get SH overthrown by his own people. Then, when W changed that policy to one of we were going to overthrow SH using our military in a direct invasion, again based essentially on the same info., the majority of the D.'s went along. Thus, it is hard to have your cake and eat it too. It really just amazed me how no one wants to attribute any fault to the D's in this. I mean if Diss and anyone who read anything knew that the Iraq info was mostly bogus before the war, don't you think the D's know ![]() Sorry for the rant - but it just bugs me when people act like the D's would never ever do anything like what W did, when the facts show they went, for the most part, hand in hand with him and had been sentencing Iraqis to death for years before W ever took power ![]() Again and so there is no confusion, I think W is a horrible person and am sad he is in office. But, that does not change the fact that the D's are horrible as well. |
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#72
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#73
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Thus, I again conclude the W will never be impeached on Iraq because the D's were right there in bed with him. In fact, the D's gave him the road to do it with their actions in 1998. To hear people say it, one could conclude W was the first ever to imply much less state SH was a terrorist who refused to comply with his obligation to demonstrate he had destroyed the WMD that the world thought he had (which he never did) , which is just not true. |
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#74
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Last edited by gldstwmn; 05-30-2005 at 01:33 PM.. |
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#75
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I despise him and wish they would take Novak down, but I think it will never happen. He is too powerful. I can only begin to imagine after 30 or so years in that business that he does not have beef on just about every politician there is. Personally, I think he invoked the priviledge argument and if that did not worl, the Fifth, though the latter imlies guilt, which it is unclear he has any of in this case. |
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